United States presidential election - Wikipedia
The next election isn't until November 8, , but the battle to of President Obama shortly before the election, which angered conservative activists. Having proven that Republicans can be competitive in Democratic. The Long Read: Our voting system worked well for decades, but now it is broken. Tough competition, loss of advertising revenue and falling sales prompt In December , a constitutional convention began work in order to . view of what people really wanted, a powerful list of shared priorities, an. The Mitt Romney presidential campaign of officially began on June 2, , when former .. double-digit lead in a hypothetical head-to-head general election contest. .. In July and August , Romney ran a recurring ad claiming that President Obama wanted to remove the work requirement for welfare recipients.
A total of thirteen debates were held before the Iowa caucuses. The first major event of the campaign was the Ames Straw Pollwhich took place in Iowa on August 13, Michele Bachmann won the straw poll this ultimately proved to be the acme of her campaign.
As a result, a number of potential "anti-Romney" candidates were put forward,   including future President Donald Trump Sarah Palin Chris Christie and Texas Governor Rick Perry the last of whom decided to run in August Perry did poorly in the debates, however, and Herman Cain and then Newt Gingrich came into the fore in October and November. Due to a number of scandals, Cain withdrew just before the end of the year, after having gotten on the ballot in several states.
One of a growing field of female Republican leadersthe New Mexico Governor is popular with minorities and female voters, and was recently re-elected in a state where President Obama defeated Mitt Romney by ten points.
Mitt Romney presidential campaign - Wikipedia
Having proven that Republicans can be competitive in Democratic states, Martinez makes a tempting candidate for conservatives wary about being outmaneuvered by Hillary Clinton. But where Ron struggled to escape his reputation as an unpredictable outsider, Rand has joined his moderate libertarianism to more traditional positions in areas like foreign policy. Rick Perry Since his audacious self-destruction during the Presidential primaries, year Texas Governor, Rick Perry has had an astonishing comeback.
Alongside building his foreign policy credentialshe has presided over an economic boom in Texas. As goes on, the polls will be a good indicator of his success. Mitt Romney Popular with Republicans who feel he should have won, benefiting from a pre-existing donor base and with strong name recognitionRomney has the foundation to make another run for the Presidency.
A poll taken last summer suggested he would now defeat President Obama. Then, inhe jumped onto the third rail of conservative politics — embracing bi-partisan immigration reform. Since that point, Rubio has struggled with the GOP. Yet all is not lost. Ironically, it may be President Obama that saves him.
Experimenters would randomly assign voters to receive varied sequences of direct mail—four pieces on the same policy theme, each making a slightly different case for Obama—and then use ongoing survey calls to isolate the attributes of those whose opinions changed as a result.
How Obama’s Team Used Big Data to Rally Voters
The experiment revealed how much voter response differed by age, especially among women. Older women thought more highly of the policies when they received reminders about preventive care; younger women liked them more when they were told about contraceptive coverage and new rules that prohibited insurance companies from charging women more.
The results were surprising.
Those scores suggested that they probably shared Republican attitudes; but here was one thing that could pull them to Obama. Traditionally, campaigns have restricted their persuasion efforts to channels like mass media or direct mail, where they can control presentation, language, and targeting.2012 Downballot Election Night - MSNBC Coverage
Sending volunteers to persuade voters would mean forcing them to interact with opponents, or with voters who were undecided because they were alienated from politics on delicate issues like abortion. They began sending trained volunteers to knock on doors or make phone calls with the objective of changing minds. That dramatic shift in the culture of electioneering was felt on the streets, but it was possible only because of advances in analytics.
Likely Obama supporters would get regular reminders from their local field organizers, asking them to return their ballots, and, once they had, a message thanking them and proposing other ways to be involved in the campaign.
The local organizer would receive daily lists of the voters on his or her turf who had outstanding ballots so that the campaign could follow up with personal contact by phone or at the doorstep. Wagner, however, was turning his attention beyond the field.
Throughout the primaries, Romney had appeared to be the only Republican running a 21st-century campaign, methodically banking early votes in states like Florida and Ohio before his disorganized opponents could establish operations there. Such techniques had offered George W. ByDemocrats had not only matched Republicans in adopting commercial marketing techniques; they had moved ahead by integrating methods developed in the social sciences.
That was the structure Obama had abandoned after winning the nomination in Instead, they fixated on trying to unlock one big, persistent mystery, which Lundry framed this way: TargetPoint also integrated content collected from newspaper websites and closed-caption transcripts of broadcast programs.
Ultimately, Lundry wanted to assess the impact that each type of public attention had on what mattered most to them: He turned to vector autoregression models, which equities traders use to isolate the influence of single variables on market movements. That informal conversation among political-class elites typically led to traditional print or broadcast press coverage one to two days later, and that, in turn, might have an impact on the horse race.
Those insights offered campaign officials a theory of information flows, but they provided no guidance in how to allocate campaign resources in order to win the Electoral College. The goal was to try to divine the calculations behind those decisions.
In early September, as part of his standard review, Lundry noticed that the week after the Democratic convention, Obama had aired 68 ads in Dothan, Alabama, a town near the Florida border.
Even though the area was known to savvy ad buyers as one of the places where a media market crosses state lines, Dothan TV stations reached only about 9, Florida voters, and around 7, of them had voted for John McCain in But they were advertising there.
Already the Obama campaign was known for its relentless e-mails beseeching supporters to give their money or time, but this one offered something that intrigued Davidsen: With Narwhal, e-mail blasts asking people to volunteer could take their past donation history into consideration, and the algorithms determining how much a supporter would be asked to contribute could be shaped by knowledge about his or her reaction to previous solicitations.
Now analysts could leverage personal data to identify the attributes of those who responded, and use that knowledge to refine subsequent appeals. Television and radio ads had to be purchased by geographic zone, and the available data on who watches which channels or shows, collected by research firms like Nielsen and Scarborough, often included little more than viewer age and gender.
How you knit that together is a challenge. But when it came to buying media, such calculations had been simply impossible, because campaigns were unable to link what they knew about voters to what cable providers knew about their customers. Walsh says of the effort to reimagine the media-targeting process: It was to find out how many of our persuadable voters were watching those dayparts.
For privacy reasons, however, the information was not available at the individual level. The Obama campaign had created its own television ratings system, a kind of Nielsen in which the only viewers who mattered were those not yet fully committed to a presidential candidate.
But Davidsen had to get the information into a practical form by early May, when Obama strategists planned to start running their anti-Romney ads.
She oversaw the development of a software platform the Obama staff called the Optimizer, which broke the day into 96 quarter-hour segments and assessed which time slots across 60 channels offered the greatest number of persuadable targets per dollar.
By September, she had unlocked an even richer trove of data: Sometimes a national cable ad was a better bargain than a large number of local buys in the 66 media markets reaching battleground states. But the occasional national buy also had other benefits. They had invested in their own media-intelligence platform, called Centraforce.
It used some of the same aggregated data sources that were feeding into the Optimizer, and at times both seemed to send the campaigns to the same unlikely ad blocks—for example, in reruns on TV Land. The campaign had plenty of those, generated by a public-opinion team of eight outside firms, and new arrivals at the Chicago headquarters were shocked by the variegated breadth of the research that arrived on their desks daily. The lead pollster, Joel Benenson, had respondents write about their experiences.
A quartet of polling firms were assigned specific states and asked to figure out which national themes fit best with local concerns.